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Abstract
Pragmatism has become an established academic topic
focused on an accepted canon of works and a number of
seminal authors. There is something ironic about this fixa-
tion of the Pragmatist tradition. An anticipation of transi-
ence and embrace of adaptability runs through many of the
classic works of Pragmatism. Nevertheless, there seems to
be a tendency to fixate Pragmatism and freeze it in its clas-
sic iterations, especially with respect to its philosophy of sci-
entific inquiry. The article seeks to retrieve the dynamics and
adaptability the classical Pragmatists built into their notion
of scientific inquiry. It seeks to illustrate the need for such
flexibility with recent developments in the field of econom-
ics. When the financial crisis struck in 2007-2008, this
involved more than the insolvency of a number of large
banks. The crisis, at the very least, also involved the bank-
ruptcy of a dominant economic model. It raised questions
about the rationality of markets and the widespread faith in
soft-touch regulation. It cast doubt on decades of neo-clas-
sical economic dogma that counseled small government,
privatisation, and free markets. Neo-classical economics did
not float free from other concerns. It informed notions
about the role of the state, the limits of public policy, and
the scope of democratic decision-making. Indeed, faith in
rational, self-correcting markets affected debates in dispa-
rate disciplines like law, political science, philosophy, ethics,
and history in many non-trivial ways. Hence, the financial
crisis is also a crisis of scientific research.
Keywords: pragmatism, dynamics, research methodology,
financial crisis, social sciences
1 Introduction
Pragmatism has become an established academic topic
focused on a widely accepted canon of classic pragmatist
works and a number of undisputed seminal authors –
from Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John
Dewey to W.V.O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, Hilary Put-
nam and others. There is something ironic about this
fixation of the pragmatist tradition. An expectation of
transience, and an embrace of adaptability and adjust-
ment, runs through many of the classic works of prag-
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matism. Yet, the canonisation of pragmatism to a certain
extent amounts to a fixation of pragmatism, to a freezing
of pragmatism around a set of historical characteristics.
Typically, this fixation is focused on pragmatism as a
philosophy of scientific inquiry. The implicit assump-
tion seems to be that even though through time pragma-
tism may generate new and different insights and be put
in the service of new and different projects, its notion of
truth and method of inquiry will remain largely
unchanged. In 1930, Legal Realist Jerome Frank warned
against such an ossification of scientific method in his
notorious work Law and the Modern Mind. Science
should not become ‘a new source of illusion, a new
escape from change and chance, a new road to the abso-
lute’.1 What was needed, Frank argued, was not so
much a scientific method, but a scientific ‘habit of
thought’. This echoed William James’s shift from the
notion that pragmatism amounted to a ‘method of
inquiry,’ to the view that pragmatism was principally a
guide for action, an ethic. It also tallied with John Dew-
ey’s criticism that in their quest for certainty and
immutability, modern philosophers had moved from
uncovering truths about the nature of the universe to
unveiling truths about the nature of knowledge. ‘If the
conditions of the possibility of knowledge can be shown
to be of an ideal and rational character,’ Dewey noted:
‘then, so it has been thought, the loss of an idealistic
cosmology in physics can be readily borne’.2
To be sure, an acceptance of the revisability of all
human knowledge, including knowledge about the gath-
ering of knowledge, is almost a precondition for entry
into the company of pragmatists. Yet, there is a wide
range of belief with respect to the certainty and variabil-
ity of scientific method among the adherents of pragma-
tism. Some – like Charles S. Peirce and Susan Haack –
primarily stress the stability of scientific method and
claim people have learned a great deal about the proce-
dures that deliver dependable knowledge. This scientific
practice and its attendant values and techniques deserve
to be handled with care because it is our best hope for
scientific progress.3 While others – most notably the late
Richard Rorty – stress the changeable, even capricious,
nature of research methods and claim the method of sci-
ence is little more than a vocabulary to talk about reality.
1. J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1970 (1929)), at 307.
2. J. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowl-
edge and Action (1960 (1929)), at 41-2.
3. S. Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays
(1998), at 7-9.
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Pragmatists like Dewey argued for the ‘need to abandon
traditional notions of rationality, objectivity, method
and truth,’ according to Rorty, and moved ‘beyond
method’. The history of science, in Rorty’s view, illus-
trates ‘the power of new vocabularies rather than the
secret of scientific success’.4
Pragmatism navigates a course somewhere between
these opposite poles of stability and dynamics, of scien-
tific realism and nominalism, and it is difficult to pin-
point exactly what coordinates it should track. Haack
has argued forcefully – and pertinently – against neo-
pragmatists, like Rorty, that veer off too far to the nomi-
nalist end of the spectrum. I have argued elsewhere that
these objections are cogent.5 Yet, that does not mean
that Haack’s alternative, and the Peircean inspiration it
draws on, plots a uniquely right trajectory for pragma-
tism, i.e. that Haack’s species of pragmatism gets the
balance between scientific realism and nominalism
exactly right. Indeed, in this paper I will argue that
Haack’s course, in turn, strays too far to the realist end
of the spectrum. This makes pragmatism look too fixed
and stable and too much like another version of scientif-
ic realism. Haack’s unadulterated Peircean understand-
ing of the pragmatist conception of science creates prob-
lems with other central aspects of pragmatism. It leads
to a conception of scientific method that is out of tune
with pragmatist notions about holism, situatedness, and
action.
But what does the pragmatist embrace of dynamics
mean with respect to inquiry? If the dynamics of prag-
matism with respect to research involves more than
changes in topics and subject matter, then what does it
entail? Does it remain limited to theoretical changes in
the way phenomena are conceived and conceptualised?
Does it affect heuristics and methodology? Or does it go
all the way down and affect basic notions about science
and the pursuit of knowledge? I will argue that there are
a number of aspects to pragmatism that suggest pragma-
tists should expect the practice of scientific research to
change and evolve more readily and more radically, than
is often assumed. Notably, the embrace of epistemologi-
cal pluralism, the emphasis on scientific research as a
form of action, and the belief in the continuity of means
and ends conspire to make for a rather more dynamic
notion of scientific practice.
I will illustrate these three aspects of the pragmatist
understanding of scientific inquiry by looking at recent
developments in the field of economics, most notably at
the slow demise of central tenets of neo-classical eco-
nomic theory, which held sway in economics and public
policy since at least the 1980s. When the financial crisis
struck in 2007-2008, this involved more than the insol-
vency of a number of large banks. The crisis also
involved the bankruptcy of the business practices of
these banks. It raised questions about the rationality of
4. R. Rorty, ‘Method, Social Science, and Social Hope’, XI:4 Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 569, at 582 (1981).
5. W. de Been, Legal Realism Regained: Saving Realism from Critical
Acclaim (2008).
the market, the belief in the wisdom of crowds, and the
widespread faith in soft-touch regulation. It cast doubt
on several decades of neo-classical economic dogma that
counseled small government, privatisation, and free
markets. For Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve and high priest of neo-classical orthodoxy, the
failure of neo-classical economics in the financial crisis
evidently involved a failure of his whole Weltan-
schauung. At the hearings of House Committee on Gov-
ernment Oversight and Reform Greenspan was clearly
taken aback by the events of 2008. When Chairman
Henry Waxman put it to Greenspan: ‘In other words,
you found that your view of the world, your ideology,
was not right. It was not working’. Greenspan answered:
‘That’s precisely the reason I was shocked, because I
had been going for forty years or more with very consid-
erable evidence that it was working exceptionally well’.6
In Greenspan’s Damascene conversion in the wake of
the financial crisis there was much more at stake than
just the falsification of an economic theory. Neo-classi-
cal economics does not float free from other concerns. It
is an economic world view that was extraordinarily suc-
cessful in the last three decades and that informed
notions about the role of the state, the limits of public
policy and the scope of democratic decision-making.
Hence, beyond the field of economics, faith in rational,
self-correcting markets also affected debates in disci-
plines like law, political science, philosophy, ethics, and
history in many non-trivial ways. Thus, the financial
crisis undermined not only the confidence people had in
their economic model, but also in their wider public
philosophy; the regulatory models they had adopted,
6. This dramatic volte face of Alan Greenspan with respect to his unshake-
able faith in rational markets drew a lot of attention. (He has back-
tracked on his confession of being mistaken, since.) By no means was
Greenspan alone, however. Another remarkable turnaround was the
loss of faith of one of the champions of law-and-economics and self-
declared pragmatist, Richard Posner. Posner had built his career as a
law-and-economics scholar on the application of rational market theory
to legal questions. When this theory was punctured, Posner dramatical-
ly distanced himself from decades of economic dogma and announced
his embrace of Keynesianism. In a 2009 article in The New Republic he
claimed: ‘We have learned since September that the present generation
of economists has not figured out how the economy works’. As a result,
the economics profession had few suggestions on how to deal with the
crisis: ‘Not having believed that what has happened could happen’,
Posner commented: ‘the profession had not thought carefully about
what should be done if it did happen’ (R. Posner, ‘How I Became a
Keynesian’, The New Republic September 2009, <www. newrepublic.
com/ article/ how -i -became -keynesian> (Consulted 24-6-2013) at 1).
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and the new balance they had pursued between the pri-
vate and the public sphere.7
The crisis of the dominant approach to economics of the
last three decades provides a vivid illustration of the way
pragmatists looked at scientific knowledge, i.e., as war-
ranted beliefs rooted in the world of practice that could
be more or less useful in dealing with reality, not as the-
ories that necessarily reflected the true nature of the
phenomenon under study. For pragmatists like Dewey
and James, the world could not be neatly carved up
between disinterested scientific research and the social
and economic projects people engaged in. They always
understood scientific research as something that emana-
ted from the practical concerns of a particular social,
cultural, and historical setting. James proposed a holistic
understanding of truth. Knowledge of the world was
part and parcel of the larger context within which scien-
tific research took place: i.e., the existential setting
researchers found themselves in and the practical proj-
ects they saw themselves as part of. James and Dewey
would not have been surprised about the way worldly
success could push to the side hesitation and doubt like
it did in the run-up to the financial crisis. Even though
James is often mistakenly criticised for coarsely reduc-
ing truth to what is expedient to believe, for focusing on
the ‘cash value of ideas’, he was keenly aware that
accomplishment and affluence could warp your under-
standing and moral stance. In a letter to H.G. Wells he
wrote famously: ‘The moral flabbiness born of the
exclusive worship of the bitch-goddess SUCCESS.
That – with the squalid cash interpretation put on the
word success – is our national disease’. This article will
interrogate the interconnections between science and
society, including the ‘squalid’ ones on display in the
recent financial crisis, and see to what extent the
dynamics they set in motion fit with a pragmatist under-
standing of scientific inquiry. This interrogation will be
organised around three central pragmatist themes and
their consequences for scientific inquiry: (1) the irredu-
cible pluralism of reality, (2) research as a form of
action, and (3) the pragmatist notion of continuity
between means and ends.
7. Indeed, several authors have pointed to the pervasive influence of free-
market economics in recent decades, well beyond the confines of the
discipline. In his short treatise on What Money Can’t Buy, Michael San-
del claims that ‘we drifted from having a market economy, to being a
market society’, which he defines as ‘a way of life in which market val-
ues seep into every aspect of human endeavor’ (M. Sandel, What Mon-
ey Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012), at 10-11). Indeed,
Sandel believes market reasoning is so ingrained in the U.S. that even
the 2008 financial crisis has not led to a loss of faith in markets. German
cultural theorist Joseph Vogl claims that the providentialist eighteenth
century notion of ‘theodicy’, of the world as an expression of divine
will, has secularized into the present-day notion of ‘oikodicy’, of the
world as the benevolent outcome of beneficent market forces. The
ghost of the free-market is everywhere and giving everyone their just
deserts (J. Vogl, Joseph, Das Gespenst des Kapitals (2010, 2011)). Rob-
ert Skidelsky claims that today ‘mainstream economics is in fact an
ideology – the ideology of the free market’ (R. Skidelsky, ‘Post-Crash
Economics’ Project Syndicate, <www. project -syndicate. org/ commen
tary/ robert -skidelsky -knocks -the -scientific -halo -off -mainstream -
economists - -teaching -and -research> (Consulted 24-6-2014)).
2 Situatedness and
Epistemological Pluralism
In his lecture on Pragmatism Putnam claims that Wil-
liam James ‘tries to “humanize” the notion of truth, to
view it (as he views all notions) as a human instrument,
and not as an idea that dropped from the sky’.8 This
introduces the first problem with a static notion of prag-
matism. If people are not disinterested intelligences
floating free from any worldly concerns and formulating
detached hypotheses about the nature of reality but situ-
ated and involved intelligences trying to find practical
answers to the going concerns of their societies, then
this opens the notion of science up to pluralism, to a
variety of perspectives rooted in diverse contexts, and
focused on the solution of diverse problems.
Pluralism is a well-known theme in James’s work, of
course. In the preface to his Talks to Teachers, James
noted that according to his pluralistic philosophy:
…the truth is too great for any one actual mind, even
though that mind be dubbed ‘the Absolute,’ to know
the whole of it. The facts and worths of life need
many cognizers to take them in. There is no point of
view absolutely public and universal. Private and
incommunicable perceptions always remain over, and
the worst of it is that those who look for them never
know where.9
This could be interpreted to mean simply that human
perspectives are limited; that people can only survey
their piece of the puzzle but never the whole jigsaw; that
there are supplemental points of view that are not
reflected even in the most comprehensive, state-of-the-
art statement of the truth we can muster.
There are good reasons to assume that such an interpre-
tation would be too modest, though. James’s pluralism
is more thoroughgoing than that. One of the reasons
James was preoccupied with pluralism was his worry
that a monistic world would lack freedom. A pluralistic
world provided room for choice, freedom, chance, and
novelty, whereas a monistic world was deterministic and
closed. Moreover, in A Pluralistic Universe James con-
tended that his finite experiences as a finite being pre-
cluded access to any absolutes, anyway:
What boots it to tell me that the absolute way is the
true way; and to exhort me, as Emerson says, to lift
mine eye up to its style and manners of the sky, if the
feat is impossible by definition. I am finite once and
for all, and all the categories of my sympathy are knit
up with the finite world as such, and with things that
have a history.10
8. H. Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995), at 21.
9. W. James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some
of Life’s Ideals (1905 (1899)), at V.
10. W. James, A Pluralistic Universe (1912), at 48.
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‘If we were readers only of the cosmic novel, things
would be different: we should then share the author’s
point of view’, James noted. However, he pointed out:
‘we are not the readers but the very personages of the
world-drama’ and the ‘tale which the absolute reader
finds so perfect, we spoil for one another through our
several vital identifications with the destinies of the par-
ticular personages involved’.11
In A Pluralistic Universe, moreover, James stressed the
understanding of our concepts as the tools on hand to
cope with our experience, not as absolutes that held
sway beyond time and place. He praised Henri Bergson
for ‘his attempt to limit the divine right of concepts to
rule our mind absolutely’ and for his conception of phi-
losophy as lying ‘flat on its belly in the middle of experi-
ence, in the very thick of its sand and gravel […] never
getting a peep at anything from above’.12 In a similar
vein, Dewey drew the conclusion from Darwin that the
world was in perennial flux and that even such basic cat-
egories as natural species lacked a true and permanent
nature. They should not be treated as permanent fix-
tures but only as temporary classifications of evolving
organisms. ‘[I]n treating the forms that had been regar-
ded as types of fixity and perfection as originating and
passing away’, Dewey wrote, ‘the “Origins of Species”
introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was
bound to transform the logic of knowledge’.13
James’s pluralism, moreover, was tied to his concerns
about what we would now call ethnocentrism. Overesti-
mation of the rightness of our own understanding and
‘pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of exis-
tence other than our own’, James considered a serious
moral failure.1415 Indeed, he warned against ‘the stupidi-
ty and injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with
the significance of alien lives’, and ‘the falsity of our
judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an abso-
lute way on the value of other persons’ conditions or
ideals’.16
The picture Susan Haack paints of pragmatism is quite
different in tone and substance from James’s pluralistic
notion. With respect to scientific knowledge, the humil-
ity of James is gone in Haack’s work. She defends sci-
ence with the temperament of a confident realist, but for
the classic pragmatists like Dewey and James scientific
knowledge, and our procedures for gathering it, always
remained provisional and tentative. They saw scientific
knowledge as makeshift explanations that helped people
deal with the world around them, but they made no
ontological claims about the nature of reality. Haack’s
account does not share this agnosticism about scientific
knowledge. When it comes to defending science, she
11. James, above n. 10, at 48-9.
12. James, above n. 10, at 277.
13. J. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays
(1997 (1910)), at 1-2.
14. W. James, On A Certain Blindness in Human Beings (1900), at 45.
15. For a thorough discussion of James’s ethical concerns in relation to plu-
ralism see: R. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn, Cambridge: Polity (2010),
at 61-9.
16. James, above n. 14, at 4.
happily adopts the title of ‘old-fashioned prig’ as a
badge of honour. For Haack science is best, whether it is
pre-eminently a Western invention or not and claims it
is an ideal of incalculable value to the whole of humani-
ty.17
Hence, her understanding of science leaves much less
room for pluralism. Indeed, she proposes the metaphor
of the crossword puzzle to exemplify what scientific
research is like. Haack contends that she was struck by
the notion ‘that the way a person’s beliefs about the
world support one another is rather like the intersecting
entries in a crossword’. Much like scientific inquiry,
according to Haack, an entry in a crossword puzzle
depends on three factors: ‘how well it is supported by its
clue and any already-completed intersecting entries;
how reasonable those intersecting entries are, indepen-
dent of the support given them by the belief in question;
and how much of the crossword has been completed’.18
Haack gets a lot of things right about pragmatism, but
there is something distinctly un-pragmatic about this
crossword metaphor. It suggest there is an underlying
framework to reality, God’s own crossword, waiting
there to be uncovered and filled in by scientists and
researchers using a single, commensurate vocabulary.
That task is vast, and there are likely to be many disa-
greements about the entries different researchers sug-
gest, – hence, pragmatists are right to hedge their bets
on the truth for the time being – but at the end of time
the whole crossword will be filled out, and the one true
solution will be known. This is a view where truth is
found, not made; where absolutes may be bracketed for
the time being but are assumed in the long run; and
where all knowledge can be transcribed into a single dis-
course. It is a view that comes close to the ‘epistemologi-
cally-centred philosophy’ that Richard Rorty criticised
for wanting ‘notions of “method” and “rationality”
which signify more than good epistemic manners,
notions which describe the way in which the mind is
naturally fitted to learn Nature’s Own Language’; or in
case of Haack, notions that describe the way in which
the mind is naturally fitted to fill in Nature’s Own
crossword puzzle.19
This crossword image is not simply an unfortunate met-
aphor that suggests an unrepresentative interpretation
of Haack’s ideas. On the contrary, the crossword analo-
gy ties in with Haack’s notion of scientific concepts and
research terms corresponding to real categories in
empirical reality, providing accurate descriptions of the
furniture of the universe. Explanation and prediction,
Haack states, require ‘the classification of things into
real kinds’.20 ‘[A] vocabulary can not only be more or
less convenient or more or less transparent in meaning,
but also – most importantly – more or less successful at
17. Haack, above n. 3, at 146-7.
18. Haack, above n. 3, at 85-6.
19. R. Rorty, ‘Method, Social Science, and Social Hope’, XI:4 Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 569, at 573 (1981).
20. S. Haack, Defending Science – Within Reason: Between Scientism and
Cynicism (2003), at 66.
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identifying kinds of stuff, or phenomenon’.21 Haack’s
focus is on the notion that there is simply one world that
exists independently from us, a world that is a certain
way whatever we think of it and that falls apart into nat-
ural categories independent if the way people describe
the world. Hence, even though this world can be descri-
bed in different languages, ultimately these descriptions
must be translatable into a single language and must
conform to the way the world is to allow for aggregation
into a coherent, non-contradictory representation of the
one world.
Usually pragmatists reject this as the ‘myth of the giv-
en’, of course, the notion that there is a given categorical
structure to the world which imposes itself on the
mind.22 Whatever their differences, for the pragmatists
the relation of our theories and conceptions and the
empirical world was much messier. James and Dewey
believed scientific questions were ultimately rooted in
the practical world and continuous with the problems
people faced. Different people living in different social
and cultural conditions, had different angles on reality
and pursued different purposes when they interacted
with the world. Rorty put it succinctly when he said that
Dewey saw ‘vocabularies as instruments for coping with
things rather than representations of their intrinsic
natures’.23 The same could be said about James. Facts
were not theoretically innocent. They were creatures of
the theoretical perspective. As a result, the pragmatists
believed that research was always infused with the con-
cerns of a particular time and place and always bore the
hallmarks of its context of origin. It was impossible to
steer clear of the perspective that informed and inspired
the research. Somebody like James knew very well, Put-
nam notes, that when there is disagreement about scien-
tific theories, when ‘disputes break out at a fundamental
level, they always cross boundaries; philosophical issues
are mixed with “scientific” ones, and cultural and even
metaphysical preconceptions play a role’.24
From a pragmatic point of view the pursuit of science
looks much less like a linear progress towards ultimate
truth and much more like a succession of makeshift sol-
utions that wed previous conceptions of reality to new,
incongruous, empirical data with the least amount of
disturbance. ‘Any idea’, James noted: ‘that helps us to
deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the
reality or its belongings, that doesn’t entangle our pro-
gress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and adapts our life
to the reality’s whole setting, will agree sufficiently to
meet the requirement. It will hold true of that reality’
(James 2011 (1907), p. 222). The metaphor of the cross-
word, with its pre-given spaces to fill in and implicit
assumption that all truth can be transcribed into a single
vocabulary, seems far too restrictive to accommodate the
kind of creativity implied in James’s account. Maybe a
better metaphor for the pragmatic conception of knowl-
21. Haack, above n. 20, at 67.
22. The phrase ‘myth of the given’ derives from the work of Wilfrid Sellars.
23. Rorty, above n. 19, at 576.
24. Putnam, above n. 8, at 15.
edge would be that of a city being fitted into a land-
scape. An urban development has to obey basic physical
constraints and the lay of the land. Moreover, it has to
conform to the basic social and physical needs of the
people that live there. But over and above that, there is
much room for different solutions and local variations in
style. The city can be developed into different directions
and can be planned in different ways. Nothing is perma-
nent. Even its basic street plan could in theory be
revised retroactively, although only at great cost. Within
a number of basic constraints – the unyielding stub-
bornness of empirical reality – much remains plastic.25
If James tried to ‘humanise’ the notion of truth, as Put-
nam suggests, then the recent vicissitudes of economics
reveal a discipline that is ‘all too human’. The pragma-
tists would not have been surprised by the fact that eco-
nomics fell short of being a pure science, aimed at unas-
sailable objective knowledge about economic behaviour,
and simply turned out to be, in the words of Stiglitz,
‘free market capitalism’s biggest cheerleader’.26 To a
certain extent, the pragmatists would have expected a
symbiotic relationship between the general push and
thrust of society and the research of its social scientists
and policy experts. (That is not to say that they would
have approved of the, almost religious, zeal with which
many politicians, bankers, business people, and academ-
ics supported rational self-regulating markets in the
boom years. Indeed, the success-worship that James saw
as a ‘national disease’ at the end of the Gilded Age, he
probably would have recognized as a character flaw in
what Paul Krugman has termed our ‘Second Gilded
Age’.27
The lesson to be learned from pragmatism with respect
to the role of economics in the financial crisis is that,
instead of unflinching loyalty to our hard-won theories,
we should take a more agnostic attitude towards our
deeply held scientific convictions and be ready to aban-
don them when they no longer help us deal with reality
25. Interestingly, Haack presents a similar metaphor when she talks about
the social sciences. The social sciences need to fit with the truths uncov-
ered by the natural sciences even if their subject matter – culturally het-
erogeneous social behaviour – does not allow for the same type of
determinate scientific explanation. When thinking about the integration
of the social and the natural sciences, Haack argues, a good model
‘might be a map in which depiction of the roads, towns, etc. is superim-
posed on a delineation of the contours of the same territory, and inte-
grated in virtue of the fact that the roads go around the lake and
through the pass in the mountains, that the town is on, not in the river,
and so on. The natural sciences draw a contour map of the biological
determinants of human nature and the biological roots of human cul-
ture, on which the social sciences superimpose a road map of marriage
customs in New Guinea, the failures of the Soviet economy, the rise of
modern science in seventeenth-century Europe, and so on’ (Haack,
above n. 20, at 161). The drift of this landscape metaphor is very differ-
ent, though. Haack is not trying to say that reality can be conceptual-
ised differently, i.e. that different cities can be fitted into a given land-
scape – which I understand to be the pragmatic stance on research in
both natural and social science, – but that the social sciences study a
miscellany of changeable cultural and social phenomena that all need to
obey a set of basic biological givens of human life established by the
natural sciences.
26. J. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World
Economy (2010), at 238.
27. P. Krugman, End This Depression Now! (2013 (2012)), at 71-5.
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and ‘start to entangle our progress in frustrations’. The
economics of efficient markets, it is good to remember,
had all the hallmarks of a rigorous science. The models,
Krugman points out, ‘were wonderfully elegant’, and
demanded ‘formidable math skills’. They were not only
highly lucrative, turning business school professors in
‘Wall Street rocket scientists, earning Wall Street pay-
checks’, but they were also grounded in ‘a great deal of
statistical evidence, which at first seemed strongly sup-
portive’.28 In short, it involved exactly the type of sci-
ence that scientific realists hold up as a model. If we
imagine the insights of neo-classical economics entered
in a crossword, there would be a great many mutually
supporting entries with independent support. And, for a
while, it all worked wonderfully well.
But then the financial crisis hit and the roof caved in on
the world economy. Almost overnight, for many people,
neo-classical economics and its policy recommendations
changed from prestigious scientific theory into ruinous
scientific delusion. The queen of the social sciences
became the dismal science once more. For economics to
put all its eggs in the neo-classical basket proved to be a
costly error. If the efficient markets model had not been
embraced as the last word on economics, but only as one
of several possible ways to look at economic behavior,
economics would have had a wider range of theoretical
resources and conceptual tools available to deal with the
collapse of the financial system, a collapse that the neo-
classical model had simply ruled out as a possibility.
The increasing professionalisation of economics and the
drive to be rigorous and scientific had led economists to
embrace increasingly sophisticated mathematics and
increasingly complex models of economic behaviour.
This had a marked effect. Essentially it put macroeco-
nomics – historically concerned with diagnosing system-
ic, economy-wide problems – on a microeconomic foot-
ing – focused on models of rational actors efficiently
pursuing their interests, models that could be translated
into elegant statistical equations. ‘Economists are all too
often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems’,
Thomas Piketty remarks, an obsession that provides ‘an
easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity
without having to answer the far more complex ques-
tions posed by the world we live in’.29 Other perspec-
tives on economics were marginalised as a result.
Indeed, Keynes, or anyone who referred to Keynes,
Krugman notes, ‘was banned from many classrooms and
professional journals’.30
Such a consensus on what constitutes valid economic
knowledge can also turn out to be mere groupthink, of
course. This seems a fair characterisation of the period
leading up to the credit crisis. Alternative perspectives
got no hearing and reports about growing imbalances
were ignored. Hence, when central bankers claimed that
no one had predicted the bubble before it broke, Stiglitz
notes that in a sense they were right: ‘no one with credi-
28. Krugman, above n. 27, at 98-9.
29. T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014 (2013)), at 32.
30. Krugman, above n. 27, at 102.
bility in their circle challenged the prevailing view, but
there was a tautology: no one challenging the prevailing
view would be treated as credible. Sharing similar views
was part of being socially and intellectually
acceptable’.31 The insights into market failures and the
hazards we were facing were typically assembled by peo-
ple outside of the dominant paradigm and they were
marginalised. The dominant paradigm was equated with
success and scientific rigor: ‘The ideologues of the Right
and the economists who gave them succor – supported
by the financial interests who were doing very well by
the deregulation movement – chose to ignore these
advances in knowledge. They chose to pretend that
Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek had had the last word
to say on market efficiency – perhaps updated by some
fancy mathematical models corroborating the results’.32
When we leave aside the question whether the pragma-
tists would have considered neo-classical economics and
its market worship a contribution to human flourishing,
then the intermeshing of economics, politics, and policy
leading up to the credit crisis in itself is roughly in
accordance with the way pragmatism understood sci-
ence as a social practice. The pragmatists thought the
notion of science as a detached and disinterested search
for certain, and objective truth was hopelessly misgui-
ded and believed science should be seen as a human
endeavor aimed at attaining human ends; as a tool in the
service of human projects. Hence, while it worked,
belief in neo-classical economics could be said to have
been warranted. Yet, when neo-classical analyses no
longer fit with events and no longer produced the conse-
quences anticipated, pragmatists certainly would have
thought this should have repercussions for the way eco-
nomics was organised and economists conducted their
research (which it did in fact for the one self-declared
pragmatist law-and-economics scholar, Richard Posner.)
Unfortunately, this is not how all economists see their
own discipline. Many do not treat their economics para-
digm as a tool that could be more or less useful, like
Dewey and James suggested, but as an established body
of objective, scientific knowledge, some outliers, and
unexplained phenomena notwithstanding. (Rare excep-
tions like ‘an occasional world-economy-destroying cri-
sis’ Krugman pointed out wryly.33 These different atti-
tudes towards scientific theory seem to play out in cur-
rent debates among economists. Many of the arguments
in economics, Krugman notes, are now about ‘pragma-
tism versus quasi-religious certainty’.34 Krugman is not
talking about classical, philosophical pragmatism here,
to be sure, but his meaning is very much in the spirit of
Dewey and James, nonetheless. Pragmatic economists
who try to come up with unorthodox solutions for the
current crisis, wherever they can find them, are pitted
against economists who are waging religious war in the
31. Stiglitz, above n. 26, at 253.
32. Stiglitz, above n. 26, at 273-4.
33. Krugman, above n. 27, at 100.
34. Krugman, above n. 27, at 104.
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name of the ‘One True Faith’ of efficient markets, no
matter how discredited.
The catastrophic failure of economics in turn has led to
calls to change the discipline. As Stiglitz notes, if you
want to succeed in reforming the economy, you ‘may
have to begin by reforming economics’.35 Dick Thaler
has called the assumption of rationality in question, fun-
damental for efficient market theory. The new field of
behavioural economics, associated with name of Thaler,
starts out from the assumption that people in fact are
often quite irrational in their decision-making. It is an
approach that does not allow for the precise modelling
that has become stock-in-trade in economics. This pre-
cision is illusory at any rate, Thaler contends, because
‘human nature is a mess’. The choice between efficient
market economics and behavioural economics, he notes,
is ‘a choice between being precisely wrong or vaguely
right’.36 Robert Skidelsky, in turn, suggests taking the
study of macroeconomics out of the business school ‘to
protect macroeconomics from the encroachment of the
methods and habits of mind of microeconomics’ and
‘mitigate the departmental concentration of maths-driv-
en economics’. In graduate schools macroeconomics
should be taught as a joint degree, Skidelsky believes,
teamed up with disciplines like history, philosophy,
sociology, politics, international relations, biology, or
anthropology, to train macroeconomists ‘whose main
value to society will lie as much in their philosophical
and political literacy as in their mathematical efficiency’.
Economics, Skidelsky believes, should abandon the
drive ‘for uniting the whole of theory under the umbrel-
la of rational expectations’ and acknowledge that ‘differ-
ent knowledge assumptions are appropriate for different
kinds of activity’.37
It remains to be seen whether economics departments
will engage in this type of restructuring. So far, the
main drive to change economics as an academic disci-
pline has come from students. Already in 2000, econom-
ics students at the University of Paris started what has
become the Post-Autistic Economics Movement with a
petition against the dominance of the neoclassical
approach in the economics curriculum. In their petition
they complained: ‘We no longer want to have this autis-
tic science imposed on us’. Economics, they believed,
had become an ‘autistic science’ with the instruction of
neo-classical economics as if it were ‘THE economic
truth’: ‘We do not accept this dogmatism. We want a
pluralism of approaches, adapted to the complexity of
the objects and to the uncertainty surrounding most big
questions in economics’.38 This protest spread across
the world and led to an open letter from economics stu-
35. Stiglitz, above n. 26, at 238.
36. J. Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward,
and Delusion on Wall Street (2009), at 298.
37. R. Skidelsky, Keynes: The Return of the Master (2010 (2009)), at
189-90.
38. Post-Autistic Economics Network, ‘A Brief History of the Post-Autistic
Economics Movement’, <www. paecon. net/ HistoryPAE. htm> (Last vis-
ited 10 July 2014).
dents from seventeen countries calling on economics
departments to reform their curriculum.
The call for reform picked up again after the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. At the University of Manchester, students
founded the Post-Crash Economics Society as a
response to the dearth of change in the economics cur-
riculum after the 2008 crash. Their initiative led to sim-
ilar revolts at economics departments across the UK.
Five years after, the crash the students at the lamented
the ‘monoculture in public and academic economics’
and argued for a broadening of the curriculum:
A situation in which the vast majority of professional
economists, economic commentators, politicians and
academics have studied only one economic paradigm
is unacceptable as we struggle to manage [an] eco-
nomic crisis and achieve sustainable prosperity. As a
result our society has no organized ability to critically
question the foundations, assumptions and practices
of the economic status quo.39
Even though reforms have so far been modest, the
financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed it
have called into question the intellectual premises on
which economics is based in the academic world, the
way research agendas are set, and the way educational
programs have weeded out heterodox perspectives.
From a pragmatic perspective such a willful evasion of
the capriciousness of social reality and such a glaring
failure to employ alternative perspectives to get to grips
with it is certainly not in accordance with the ethic they
wanted to instill in scientists. It is not clear what Haack
would make of the evident failures of economics in the
years that followed the credit crisis. Her conception of
pragmatism as a methodological position, however,
clearly vitiates against pluralism and agnosticism about
the truth of scientific knowledge.
3 Action
A second reason pragmatism is at odds with a notion of
scientific method that remains stable and unchanging is
the centrality of action. Scientific research, according to
the pragmatists, did not involve passive registration of a
pre-given order in reality but required active interven-
tion and manipulation of the world. John Dewey,
famously, criticised the ‘spectator theory’ of knowledge.
In The Quest for Certainty – tellingly subtitled A Study
of the Relation of Knowledge and Action – he wrote that
many of the classic problems of epistemology follow
from this conception of the passive spectator involved in
detached observation:
39. Post-Crash Economics Society, ‘Economics, Education and Unlearning:
Economics Education at the University of Manchester’, <www. post -
crasheconomics. com/ economics -education -and -unlearning/ > (Last vis-
ited 13 July 2014).
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They spring from the assumption that the true and
valid object of knowledge is that which has being pri-
or to and independent of the operations of knowing.
They spring from the doctrine that knowledge is a
grasp or beholding of reality without anything being
done to modify its antecedent state – the doctrine
which is the source of the separation of knowledge
from practical activity. If we see that knowing is not
the act of the outside spectator but of a participator
inside the natural and social scene, then the true
object of knowledge resides in the consequences of
directed action.40
This is a conception of knowledge that is pregnant with
potentialities. Indeed, Dewey observes that one could
even say ‘“there are as many kinds of valid knowledge as
there are conclusions wherein distinctive operations
have been employed to solve the problems set by antece-
dently experienced situations’. Since these experienced
situations and the operations dealing with them ‘never
exactly repeat one another’, they ‘do not determine
exactly the same consequences’. To be sure, it is only
when the operations fall into ‘certain kinds or types’,
i.e., only when we act in an organised, premeditated
manner, that they fall within the ambit of science.41
For pragmatists science is continuous with our efforts as
a species to shape and control our environment, in other
words. As an organised and disciplined form of acting
on the world, science is only a subset of a much more
nebulous cluster of practical human interactions with
the living environment. When you see science this way,
when you see it as part of a larger and fluid continuum
of activity, it becomes difficult to demarcate and define
with any precision. Hence, when the pragmatists discuss
inquiry, they do not provide us with a protocol, a set of
rules, or a detailed plan of action, rather they describe a
process and a mindset. ‘For Peirce and Dewey’, Putnam
notes: ‘inquiry is cooperative human interaction with an
environment; and both aspects, the active intervention,
the active manipulation of the environment, and the
cooperation with other human beings, are vital’.42 This
lists all the key elements in the pragmatist conception of
science. Inquiry is empirical and experimental – the
‘active intervention’ and ‘active manipulation’ part –
and it is theory driven, i.e., guided by open and rea-
soned debate in the research community about what
theories and hypotheses are most warranted – the ‘coop-
erative human interaction’ part. It is not so much a
theory, as a description of a process or practice. In the
words of Hilary Putnam: ‘Peirce and James and Dewey
would have said that democratically conducted inquiry
is to be trusted; not because it is infallible, but because
the way in which we will find out where and how our
procedures need to be revised is through the process of
inquiry itself’.43 James Conant makes a similar observa-
40. Dewey, above n. 2, at 196.
41. Dewey, above n. 2, at 197.
42. Putnam, above n. 8, at 70.
43. Putnam, above n. 8, at 74-5.
tion with respect to the James’s understanding of prag-
matism. ‘James is not offering any arguments which will
logically compel us to assent to a particular thesis’, Con-
ant notes: ‘He proposes pragmatism not as a theory
(something that might be true or false), but as a guide
for action (something which might or might not serve us
well in “our conduct of the business of living”)’.44
It is important to keep in mind, here, that for the prag-
matist ‘action’ was genuinely open-ended and creative.
For them truth in a very real sense was not found, but
made. This aspect perhaps comes out most clearly in the
work of James. ‘The truth of an idea is not a stagnant
property inherent in it’, James asserted, ‘Truth happens
to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its
verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely
of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the
process of its valid-ation’.45 Obviously, this was a pro-
cess that involved researchers not as passive witnesses of
a given order, but as creative actors.
This voluntaristic conception of scientific research
comes out clearly in James’ critique of social Darwinism
and its deterministic bearings. In reaction to the work of
his highly influential contemporary Herbert Spencer
who emphasised a static notion of the fitness of human
beings to their environment, James stressed the adapta-
bility and creativity of human beings. For Spencer the
‘fit’ were naturally adapted to the unchangeable and
static circumstances of life and the ‘unfit’ inevitably
went under. Social science, Spencer argued, could
uncover these eternal laws of nature. James could not
disagree more:
The knower is an actor, and coefficient of the truth
on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth
which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypothe-
ses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human
action – action which to a great extent transforms the
world – help to make the truth which they declare. In
other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth
upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and
not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the should-
be, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of
the cogitandum as if they were excrescenses, or
meant, at most, survival.46
According to Conant, this notion that knowers are
actors who make the truth, should be taken quite literal-
ly. For James, Conant argues, there were beliefs ‘that
have the peculiar characteristic that, by virtue of one’s
having adopted them, they become true’. With this
James did not mean that in the sense that you adopt a
truth and then discover it is actually true, ‘but in the
sense that, in the course of allowing the conduct of one’s
44. J. Conant, ‘The James/Royce Dispute and the Development of James’s
“Solution”’, in R.A. Putnam (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Wil-
liam James (1997), 186, at 200.
45. W. James, ‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth’, in J.R. Shook (ed.), The
Essential William James (2011 (1907)), at 217.
46. W. James, Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence
(1878).
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life to be informed by them, one actually brings into
being (or at least contributes to bringing into being) the
very conditions which make them true’.47 Indeed, Con-
ant argues that James also thought of pragmatism in
these terms. For James, Conant argues, a pragmatist ‘is
– not just someone who affirms a particular thesis after a
chain of argument has convinced him of the truth but
rather – a kind of person one becomes through a particu-
lar way of life’. This is a conception of pragmatism,
Conant argues, that ‘is bound to exhibit in its results a
certain degree of agent-relativity’.48
This might seem a rather idiosyncratic notion of truth,
but it ties in with quite familiar processes in the social
sciences and legal and political theory. Social theorists
have long grappled with the problem of reflexivity, of
course, with the problem that theories describing social
behaviour affect the social behaviour described. It is also
a notion of truth that Haack has no truck with. The
pragmatist notion of ‘action’ is not a central concept in
Haack’s theory, but she is fairly critical of this notion of
reflexivity in social science. For Haack, this is a form of
‘self-aggrandisement’, a misplaced belief that the social
scientist’s theories about social institutions affect the
way these institutions function. Fortunately, she claims,
‘it isn’t true, and sociologists aren’t really quite so pow-
erful as some of them like to think they are’. After all,
Haack states, it is clear that ‘[S]ocial scientists no more
brought child abuse or schizophrenia or homosexuality
into existence by their intellectual activities than biolo-
gists brought anthrax into existence by theirs’.49
As a rhetorical flourish these examples might work.
However, as instances of supposed reflexivity – ‘sup-
posed’ because you have to wonder whether any con-
temporary sociologist is actually suggesting that child
abuse, schizophrenia, and homosexuality are reflexively
constructed phenomena – they are fairly weak and over
the top. Social scientists did not bring about homosex-
uality, but they certainly may have had an influence on
the attitudes towards homosexuality, and other minority
groups. Nor did social scientists call forth schizophre-
nia, but you only have to read up on the history of men-
tal illness to realise that there are considerable shifts in
the classification and diagnosis of mental illnesses.
‘Female hysteria’ was perceived to be a widespread
problem in the nineteenth century, but has disappeared
as a diagnosis in our time. ‘Neurasthenia’ a kind of nerv-
ous exhaustion allegedly caused by the fast pace of mod-
ern society was once a common ailment in the United
States. Indeed, William James coined the phrase ‘Amer-
icanitis’ for it. Clearly these pathologies are more than
simply objective physiological states. And for those who
believe we have outgrown such unfounded diagnoses:
Who will tell whether Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) will still be recognised as a genuine
problem in the twenty-second century? Economics did
not create trade or the marketplace, but it may very well
47. Conant, above n. 44, at 205-6.
48. Conant, above n. 44, at 206.
49. Haack, above n. 20, at 163.
have affected the way people perceive their role in the
market place and the way they think they should behave
when they enter the market place.
If we go back to the example of neo-classical economics,
one could certainly raise the question whether the
notion that economic agents are modelled as rational
and self-interested individuals, suggests to people that
rational pursuit of their self-interest is appropriate
behaviour for the marketplace. The descriptive model
then becomes a guideline for behaviour and creates its
own corroboration. In this respect, Jospeh Vogl is quite
right to claim in a recent interview that ‘Economics tries
to understand a world that it has itself created’.50
Rationality, self-interest, and greed are timeless and
universal aspects of human behaviour, no doubt. Never-
theless, in recent decades the basic assumptions of neo-
classical economics about the rationality of economic
agents and the efficiency of the market developed into
something more than mere descriptions of human
behaviour and scientific hypotheses to be tested. These
assumptions became part of a drive to privatise public
services, to liberalise markets, to de-regulate, to intro-
duce market incentives in regulatory regimes, and to fall
back on the power of social and economic domains to
regulate themselves. These tied in with a big historic
narrative of the road out of serfdom, the story of the fall
of communism, the end of ideology, and the victory of
democracy and free-market capitalism. Indeed, the
vocabulary of the market has entered into the very lan-
guage of many public institutions and organisations,
who now talk of delivering products, managing process-
es, serving clients, and achieving targets.
Michael Sandel has described in vivid detail how widely
the values of the market have spread in contemporary
societies. He contends that ‘what is striking is how
potent this image has become – not only in academia but
also in everyday life. To a remarkable degree, the last
few decades have witnessed the remaking of social rela-
tions in the image of market relations’.51 In his book,
Sandel provides a wide variety of examples to illustrate
the extent to which market notions now pervade our
everyday life, from commercials in the classroom to the
hiring professional queue standers for public hearings.
For him the financial crisis and the greed it exposed
only illustrates the larger story: i.e., the propagation of
market-oriented thinking into all corners of society.
This, according to Sandel is ‘one of the most significant
developments of our time’.52
Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang, in turn, has drawn
attention to the way the ethic of the free market tends to
crowd out non-selfish, altruistic behaviour. ‘Assume the
50. Interview with Joseph Vogl in: The European, ‘The Spectre of Capital:
Capital and Money Are Profane Gods’, <www. theeuropean -magazine.
com/ 371 -vogl -joseph/ 370 -the -spectre -of -capital> (last visited on the
5th of June 2015).
51. M.J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets
(2012), at 51.
52. Sandel, above n. 51,at 7.
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worst about people’, he asserts: ‘and you get the
worst’.53 Yet, even with this crowding-out process, self-
interest can only explain human behaviour to a degree.
A great deal of human behaviour remains unselfish and
is driven by other motives. Hence, management regimes
that appeal only to people’s self-interest lead to subopti-
mal performance.
Stiglitz has also noted that economics theory is a kind of
self-fulfilling prophecy, i.e., that people who study eco-
nomics start conforming to its basic tenets:
Most of us would not like to think that we conform to
the view of man that underlies prevailing economic
models, which is of a calculating, rational, self-serv-
ing, and self-interested individual. There is no room
for human empathy, public spiritedness, or altruism.
One interesting aspect of economics is that the model
provides a better description of economists than it
does of others, and the longer students study eco-
nomics, the more like the model they become.54
The model of economic man may be a poor approxima-
tion of actual human behaviour, but for people engaged
in economic activity it functions as a prescriptive model
and tells them what would be rational for them to do in
that context.
It would be grossly unfair to associate William James
with this process without some strong qualifications.
When he talked about people ‘making the truth which
they declare’ he did not mean that they should create a
world of selfish scoundrels, by acting on the assumption
that everybody was a selfish scoundrel and adopting the
lifestyle. He was not arguing for a race to the bottom, a
vicious circle where people conformed to the basest
expectations they had of their fellow citizens. Rather, he
was arguing for a virtuous circle, where through sheer
will people lived according to their highest aspirations
and helped create a world where those aspirations
became operative principles and true.
If one takes the notion of ‘action’ seriously, that lies at
the heart of pragmatism, and the way it is bound up
with freedom, novelty, and creativity, it becomes hard
to fit it into the type of quantitative empirical social sci-
ence that reached a high point in neo-classical econom-
ics. Economics is interested in routine behaviour, not
creative action. It is interested in the standard, the regu-
lar, the predictable, in causal patterns. James suggests,
however, that this does not capture what is most inter-
esting about human beings. What is more, he contends
that this is not how researchers should conduct them-
selves in scientific inquiry. Scientific research is also
pre-eminently a domain of creative action that cannot be
reduced to simply following the right procedures and
routines.
53. H-J. Chang, 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism (2010),
at 41.
54. Stiglitz, above n. 26, at 249.
4 Continuity of Means and
Ends
A final problem for a static notion of scientific method is
the pragmatist claim that there is a continuity between
means and ends. In practice, pragmatists suggest, it is
impossible to separate the end being pursued from the
means through which people are trying to pursue it.
According to Dewey, we do not start with some clear
idea of an end and then decide on the best means to
bring it about. Rather, we only realise what end we are
striving for, when we start forming notions about how
to achieve progress in that direction:
The connection of means-consequences is never one
of bare succession in time, such that the element that
is means is past and gone when the end is instituted.
An active process is strung out temporarily, but there
is a deposit at each stage and point entering cumula-
tively and constitutively into the outcome. A genuine
instrumentality for is always an organ of an end. It
confers continued efficacy upon the object in which it
is embodied.55
If you make action central to your conception of
research, then this continuity of means-ends, or means-
consequences, is also relevant to the conception of that
practice of course. Dewey clearly shared James’s notion
of science as a form of creative action. He very much
approved of the ‘alteration in the “seat of authority”’,
that James advocated ‘looking forward instead of back-
ward, looking to what the world and life might become
instead to what they have been’.56
Nevertheless, the continuity of means and ends was
mainly a theme in the work of John Dewey. There is no
explicit counterpart to that tenet in the work of William
James, but Putnam rightly points out that ‘One of the
chief characteristics of James’s philosophy is its holism’.
Indeed, Putnam claims ‘there is an obvious if implicit
rejection of many familiar dualisms: fact, value, and
theory are all seen by James as interpenetrating and
interdependent’.57 Obviously, this interpenetration rai-
ses all kinds of questions about scientific method. If we
reverse ‘the seat of authority’ in research, as the pragma-
tists suggested, i.e., if we look forward and actively try
to learn from premeditated manipulations of reality,
then a change in the ends we pursue will have repercus-
sions for the way we adjust reality and the way we con-
duct our research. Vice versa, the methods we have
ready at hand, the kinds of procedures available to us to
act on the world, will shape our notion of what ends we
can pursue. In a pragmatist perspective, scientific
research weds these different elements, the availability
of certain instruments, techniques or sets of raw infor-
55. J. Dewey, Experience and Nature (1997 (1925)), at 298.
56. Dewey, above n. 2, at 284-5.
57. H. Putnam, ‘James’s Theory of Truth’, in R.A. Putnam (ed.), The Cam-
bridge Companion to William James (1997), 166, at 7.
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mation can help to shape what ‘ends’ we can try to ach-
ieve. While the hazy notions of what ends we want to
pursue will suggest ways to develop our instruments,
hone our techniques, and provide directions for the col-
lection of data.
Again with respect to the continuity between means and
ends, Haack’s account of pragmatism seems to diverge
in tone and substance from the ideas of James and Dew-
ey. To be sure, the continuity between means and ends
does not figure prominently in Haack’s discussion of
pragmatism. However, some parts of Haack’s analysis
seem difficult to square with a continuity between
means and ends. As we saw earlier, the notion of situat-
edness is not central to Haack’s account of pragmatism.
Haack, rather, recommends the notion of the disinteres-
ted inquirer standing aloof from the concerns and proj-
ects of his, or her, social and cultural setting. Indeed,
she seems to prefer people to get involved with inquiry
without any form of prior engagement with the object of
study altogether, ‘because it’s their job’ or ‘because they
have to write a dissertation on something’.58 This ideal of
the lone outsider-observer is difficult to square with the
idea of the situated researcher engaging with the going
projects of his, or her, day and applying existing tools
and instruments – including the existing conceptual
apparatus – into new territory. Moreover, the idea that
scientific knowledge is progressing towards Peirce’s
‘Final Opinion’ throws a different light on the issue of
the continuity between means and ends. The concepts,
the vocabularies, and the way the data are conceived
may change through time, and these conceptual tools
may be symbiotically connected to the scientific theories
under consideration, but that does not necessarily mean
pluralism and incommensurability for Haack. If these
changes are part of the progress towards the Final Opin-
ion, then they should just be seen as a form of progress
and refinement. Peirce, Haack argues, ‘sees the growth
of meaning as contributing to the progress of science’.
According to Peirce, Haack states, ‘devising concepts
and developing vocabularies, that match up adequately
to real “generals”, i.e., to real kinds of stuff, is an impor-
tant element of that enterprise’.59 This recasting of
pragmatic notions of pluralism and conceptual change as
simply a form of scientific progress does not do justice
to the work of Dewey and James, however.
There is also a dimension of the continuity between
means and ends in the recent dominance of the efficient
markets model. Perhaps it is no surprise that the rise of
sophisticated mathematical modelling in economics
coincided with the ready availability of computers.
Complicated statistical equations, that would have taken
a great deal of time and skill to do manually, can be run
through a computer relatively easily. Data sets that used
to be stored on punched cards or magnetic tapes can
now be called up with the click of a button. Good data
sets used to be hard to come by, now they are ubiqui-
58. Haack, above n. 20, at 170.
59. S. Haack, ‘The Meaning of Pragmatism: The Ethics of Terminology and
the Language of Philosophy’, 28:3 Teorema 9, at 15 (2009).
tous. It is a lot easier to be an economic ‘rocket scien-
tist’, when the computer does a lot of the work for you.
These ubiquitous data, in turn, were not conceived
immaculately. Data are collected for a purpose. They
are engendered with theoretical notions and practical
applications in mind. They measure such phenomena as
performance, value, output, usage, choice, cost and
quantify measurable aspects of human behaviour. Data
only provide a partial representation of the social world,
of course. They highlight certain aspects of social and
economic life and push others into the background. In a
way they are creatures of the theoretical paradigm they
feed into, they co-evolve with the theories they provide
empirical input for. With such interpenetration every-
thing is continuous; to a certain extent data, theories,
methods, and policy objectives stand or fall together.
This does not mean they form a hermetic, self-referen-
tial, and un-falsifiable conglomeration. Indeed, neo-
classical economics was thoroughly disproven (even if
many politicians and high profile economists do not rec-
ognize that fact). But it does mean that when theories
run into trouble, these troubles also affect methods and
the framing of data.
How the available data and the existing body of theory
hang together and interpenetrate was illustrated vividly
by Richard Posner recently. Posner explained he had
read John Maynard Keynes’ classic work The General
Theory (1936), to see what it had to say about the finan-
cial crisis. He soon found out that it was a work that was
difficult to understand. It is a book from a different age,
Posner claimed, based on a different conception of eco-
nomics: ‘it […] bristles with unfamiliar terms, such as
“unit-good” (an hour’s employment of ordinary labor),
and references to unfamiliar economic institutions, such
as a “sinking fund” (a fund in which money is accumu-
lated to pay off a debt)’.60 These difficulties have turned
The General Theory in an unread classic, an inaccessible
treatise that demands a great deal of effort to make sense
of.
This suggests that the reason economic theory is obsti-
nate and resistant to change is in part institutional.
Economists work in an intellectual environment in
which certain understandings of economic behaviour are
dominant, understandings that affect the way data are
conceptualised and collected. This creates an in-built
inertia, a bias against change in the discipline. Hence,
contrary to what the pragmatists might have expected,
not dominant interests in society or a longing for famili-
arity are obstacles to social change, but the very research
community that is supposed to analyze social develop-
ments and infer possible consequences. It should come
as no surprise, then, that scholars are among the most
reluctant to change. The economist Richard Thaler has
warned that there will be no reconsideration of intellec-
tual positions. With respect to the effects of the financial
crisis on the economics discipline, he stated: ‘What is
60. R. Posner, ‘How I Became a Keynesian’, The New Republic (September
2009), <www. newrepublic. com/ article/ how -i -became -keynesian> (Last
visited 24 June 2013).
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the old line – that science progresses funeral by funeral?
Nobody changes their mind. What will happen is that
the economists [in their thirties and forties] are pretty
open to these ideas. They don’t think it is very contro-
versial. That’s where economics will be in ten years’.61
5 Conclusion
The pragmatist theory of knowledge is often taken to be
the most significant part of pragmatism and is often
described as a fairly static theoretical doctrine contain-
ing a number of familiar premises. This paper has called
into question this static notion of pragmatist epistemol-
ogy. For the pragmatists the theory of knowledge was
not a timeless set of instructions, but an ethic, a posture,
a loose guide for how scientists should conduct them-
selves.
There are a number of reasons for this role-centered
outlook on epistemology. Pragmatism understands sci-
entific enquiry as a situated endeavour, as a practice that
is part of the going projects of society. This casts scien-
tific inquiry as an instrument in the service of a wide
variety of interests reflecting the irreducible social and
cultural pluralism of the world. This pluralism vitiates
against an unchangeable method of science. Moreover,
the pragmatists saw scientific inquiry as a form of crea-
tive action. For them science is not backward, but for-
ward looking. Science is not about registering what has
been, but about employing your intelligence to actively
manipulate the world and bring about the results pre-
dicted. This exercise is fundamentally unpredictable
and creative and will betray a certain degree of agent rel-
ativity. Finally, the pragmatists believed there was a
continuity of means and ends, between research meth-
ods and research findings. This makes research contin-
gent on the going approaches available and the theoreti-
cal and epistemological context in which the research
takes place. These will differ according to time and
place.
61. J. Cassidy, ‘Interview with Richard Thaler’, <www. newyorker. com/
online/ blogs/ johncassidy/ 2010/ 01/ interview -with -richard -thaler. htm>
(Last visited 3 April 2014).
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